# en/-10-000-gold.xml.gz
# zh/-10-000-gold.xml.gz

# en/-neo-ottoman--turkey.xml.gz
# zh/-neo-ottoman--turkey.xml.gz

# en/1929-or-1989.xml.gz
# zh/1929-or-1989.xml.gz

(src)="1"> 1929 or 1989 ?
(trg)="1"> 1929年还是1989年 ?
(src)="2"> PARIS – As the economic crisis deepens and widens , the world has been searching for historical analogies to help us understand what has been happening .
(src)="3"> At the start of the crisis , many people likened it to 1982 or 1973 , which was reassuring , because both dates refer to classical cyclical downturns .
(trg)="2"> 巴黎-随着经济危机不断加深和蔓延 ， 整个世界一直在寻找历史上的类似事件希望有助于我们了解目前正在发生的情况 。 一开始 ， 很多人把这次危机比作1982年或1973年所发生的情况 ， 这样得类比是令人宽心的 ， 因为这两段时期意味着典型的周期性衰退 。
(src)="5"> The tendency is either excessive restraint ( Europe ) or a diffusion of the effort ( the United States ) .
(src)="6"> Europe is being cautious in the name of avoiding debt and defending the euro , whereas the US has moved on many fronts in order not to waste an ideal opportunity to implement badly needed structural reforms .
(trg)="3"> 如今人们的心情却是沉重多了 ， 许多人开始把这次危机与1929年和1931年相比 ， 即使一些国家政府的表现仍然似乎把视目前的情况为是典型的而看见的衰退 。 目前的趋势是 ， 要么是过度的克制 （ 欧洲 ） ， 要么是努力的扩展 （ 美国 ） 。 欧洲在避免债务和捍卫欧元的名义下正变得谨慎 ， 而美国已经在许多方面行动起来 ， 以利用这一理想的时机来实行急需的结构性改革 。
(src)="8"> Of course , the fall of the house of Lehman Brothers has nothing to do with the fall of the Berlin Wall .
(src)="9"> Indeed , on the surface it seems to be its perfect antithesis : the collapse of a wall symbolizing oppression and artificial divisions versus the collapse of a seemingly indestructible and reassuring institution of financial capitalism .
(trg)="4"> 然而 ， 作为地域战略学家 ， 无论是从政治意义还是从经济意义上 ， 让我自然想到的年份是1989年 。 当然 ， 雷曼兄弟公司的倒闭和柏林墙的倒塌没有任何关系 。 事实上 ， 从表面上看 ， 两者似乎是完全是相反的 ： 一个是象征着压抑和人为分裂的柏林墙的倒塌 ， 而另一个是看似坚不可摧的并令人安心的金融资本主义机构的倒塌 。
(src)="11"> The end of the East-West ideological divide and the end of absolute faith in markets are historical turning points .
(src)="12"> And what happens in 2009 may jeopardize some of the positive results of 1989 , including the peaceful reunification of Europe and the triumph of democratic principles over nationalist , if not xenophobic , tendencies .
(trg)="5"> 然而 ， 和1989年一样 ， 2008-2009年很可能也能被视为一个划时代的改变 ， 其带来的发人深省的后果将在几十年后仍能让我们感受得到 。 东西方意识形态鸿沟的结束 ， 以及对市场绝对信心的后果 ， 都是历史的转折点 。 而2009年所发生的事情可能会威胁1989年革命所带来的积极成果 ， 包括欧洲的和平统一和民主制度战胜了民族主义倾向 ， 如果不是恐外倾向的话 。
(src)="13"> In 1989 , liberal democracy triumphed over the socialist ideology incarnated and promoted by the Soviet Bloc .
(src)="14"> For many of his supporters , it was President Ronald Reagan who , with his deliberate escalation of the arms race , pushed the Soviet economy to the brink , thereby fully demonstrating the superiority of liberal societies and free markets .
(trg)="6"> 1989年 ， 自由民主战胜了由苏联集团具体化并推崇的社会主义意识形态 。 对于里根总统的许多的支持者来说 ， 就是他精心策划的军备竞赛的升级 ， 把苏联经济推向了崩溃的边缘 ， 从而充分显示了自由社会和自由市场的优越性 。
(src)="16"> First , and perhaps above all , the revolutions of 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union put an end to global bipolarity .
(src)="17"> By contrast , 2009 is likely to pave the way to a new form of bipolarity , but with China substituting for the Soviet Union .
(trg)="7"> 当然 ， 现在的情况和1989年的情况明显不同了 。 首先 ， 也许是最重要的 ， 1989年的革命和随后的苏联解体结束了全球的两极化 。 与此相反 ， 2009年很可能会为一种新的两极化形式铺平道路 ， 只是中国取代了苏联 。
(src)="18"> Second , whereas democracy and market capitalism appeared as clear – if more fragile than expected – winners in 1989 , it is difficult in 2009 , with the spread of the global crisis , to distinguish winners from losers .
(src)="19"> Everyone seems to be a loser , even if some are more affected than others .
(trg)="8"> 其二 ， 民主制度和市场资本主义 ， 或许要比预期的要脆弱些 ， 看来确实是当时的赢家 。 而在2009年 ， 随着全球危机的蔓延 ， 却很难区分赢家和输家 ； 每个人似乎都是输家 ， 即使有些国家比其它国家受到的影响更大 。
(src)="20"> Yet , history is unfair , and the US , despite its greater responsibility for today ’ s global crisis , may emerge in better shape than most countries from the morass .
(src)="21"> In better shape , but not alone .
(trg)="9"> 而历史是不公平的 。 尽管美国要为当今的全球危机负更大的责任 ， 但美国可能会比大多数国家以更良好的势态走出困境 。 美国会恢复得更好 ， 但并不是唯一能恢复的国家 。 作为哈佛大学和麻省理工学院的访问教授 ， 我能看到危机过后的世界是什么样子的 。
(src)="23"> One senses something like the making of an American-Asian dominated universe .
(src)="24"> From the incredible media lab at MIT to the mathematics and economics departments at Harvard , Asians Chinese and Indians – , in particular are – everywhere , like the Romans in Athens in the first century BC : full of admiration for those from whom they were learning so much , and whom they would overcome in the coming decades .
(trg)="10"> 我们能感受到一个美国和亚洲占主导地位的世界正在形成 。 从一流的麻省理工学院的媒体实验室到哈佛大学的数学和经济系 ， 亚洲人-尤其是中国和印度人-到处都是 ， 犹如公元前一世纪在雅典的罗马人一样 ： 他们对那里学到太多东西的人们充满了敬佩 ， 而他们将在今后几十年打败他们学习的对象 。
(src)="25"> But before this new order appears , the world may be faced with spreading disorder , if not outright chaos .
(src)="26"> What , for example , will happen to a country as central and vulnerable as Egypt when hundred of thousands of Egyptians working in the Gulf are forced to return to their homeland as a result of the crisis in the oil-producing countries ?
(trg)="11"> 但是 ， 在这一新秩序的出现之前 ， 世界可能会面临更广泛的混沌 ， 如果不是彻底的混乱的话 。 例如 ， 对埃及这样一个重要而又脆弱的国家 ， 有数十万的埃及人曾在海湾工作但现在因石油生产国出现的危机而被迫返回了自己的家园 ， 那埃及会发生什么情况呢 ？ 当富人不再那么富了 ， 穷人就会更穷 。 还有 ， 对于那些追求 “ 欧洲梦 ” 的外来工人 ， 现在他们面临着理应是开放的欧洲国家的仇外心态可能的爆发 ， 他们会有怎样的遭遇 ？
(src)="29"> The consequences of 1989 ended up being less enduring than many observers , including me , would have assumed .
(src)="30"> We can only hope that , in the end , the consequences of 2009 similarly prove to be far less dramatic than we now – intuitively and in our historical reflexes – feel them to be .
(trg)="12"> 1989年革命所带来的成果 ， 最后没有包括我在内许多观察家所想象的那么持久 。 我们只能希望2009年的危机同样地最后被证明是远远低于我们现在以直觉和历史回顾的方式 � � 感觉到的那么剧烈 。

# en/19th-congress-xi-jinping-development-plan-by-andrew-sheng-and-xiao-geng-2017-10.xml.gz
# zh/19th-congress-xi-jinping-development-plan-by-andrew-sheng-and-xiao-geng-2017-10.xml.gz

# en/2008-crisis-lessons-weak-governance-by-helmut-k--anheier-2018-10.xml.gz
# zh/2008-crisis-lessons-weak-governance-by-helmut-k--anheier-2018-10.xml.gz

(src)="1"> One Hundred Years of Ineptitude
(trg)="1"> 百年愚顽
(src)="2"> BERLIN – The global financial and economic crisis that began in 2008 was the greatest economic stress-test since the Great Depression , and the greatest challenge to social and political systems since World War II .
(src)="3"> It not only put financial markets and currencies at risk ; it also exposed serious regulatory and governance shortcomings that have yet to be fully addressed .
(trg)="2"> 柏林 — — 2008年爆发的全球金融和经济危机是自大萧条以来最严峻的一次经济压力测试 ， 也是自二战以来社会和政治制度所面临的最严重挑战 。 它不仅对金融市场和货币构成威胁 ； 而且还暴露了迄今为止都无法完全解决的严重的监管和治理缺陷 。
(src)="4"> In fact , the 2008 crisis will most likely be remembered as a watershed moment , but not because it led to reforms that strengthened economic resilience and removed vulnerabilities .
(src)="5"> On the contrary , leaders ’ failure to discern , much less act on , the lessons of the Great Recession may open the way for a series of fresh crises , economic and otherwise , in the coming decades .
(trg)="3"> 事实上 ， 2008年危机极有可能被视为一座分水岭 ， 但却并非因为它导致了强化经济弹性和消除经济弱点的改革而永久留在人们的记忆当中 。 相反 ， 领导人未能汲取大萧条的教训 ， 更不用说为此采取相应的预防对策可能引发未来几十年一系列新的经济和其他危机 。
(src)="6"> However serious those crises turn out to be , historians a century from now will likely despair at our shortsightedness .
(src)="7"> They will note that analysts and regulators were narrowly focused on fixing the financial system by strengthening national oversight regimes .
(trg)="4"> 无论这些危机有多严重 ， 一个世纪后的历史学家都极有可能绝望于我们的短视 。 他们将会看到 ， 分析人士和监管机构通过强化国家监管机制 ， 仅仅是狭隘地专注于修复金融体系 。 尽管这一目标并非全无价值 ， 但就像历史学家们所指出的那样 ， 这绝不是唯一一件必须要做的事 。
(src)="10"> Yet not nearly enough has been invested in this effort .
(src)="11"> Beyond regional bodies like the European Union , international financial governance has remained largely untouched .
(trg)="5"> 为使世界能够以确保可持续及平衡增长的方式来应对全球化和技术进步所带来的挑战 ， 就必须对国内和国际两级治理机构和制度进行大规模升级 。 但目前这方面的投入还远远不够 。 除欧盟等地区机构外 ， 国际金融治理机构基本仍未受到波及 。
(src)="12"> Worse , because the partial fixes to the financial system will enable even more globalization , they will end up making matters worse , as strain on already-inadequate governance and regulatory frameworks increases , not only in finance , but also in other economic and technological fields .
(src)="13"> Meanwhile , enormous financial investments focused on securing a higher rate of return are likely to fuel technological innovation , further stressing regulatory systems in finance and beyond .
(trg)="6"> 更糟的是 ， 因为部分修复金融体系将会带来进一步全球化 ， 这些举措最终会恶化现有问题 ， 因为此举不仅在金融 、 而且在其他经济和技术领域增加了对本已欠缺的治理和监管框架的压力 。 此外 ， 专注于提高回报率的巨额金融投资很有可能会推动技术创新 ， 并由此进一步加大对金融和其他监管体系所造成的压力 。
(src)="14"> Major technological advances fueled by cheap money can cause markets to change so fast that policy and institutional change cannot keep up .
(src)="15"> And new markets can emerge that offer huge payoffs for early adopters or investors , who benefit from remaining several steps ahead of national and international regulators .
(trg)="7"> 廉价资金推动的重大技术创新可以令市场变化速度快到政策和机构变化均无法适应 。 同时新市场的出现可以为早期进入者或投资者带来巨大的回报 ， 并使他们可以持续受益于相对国内及国际监管机构的领先 。
(src)="17"> New technology-enabled financial instruments created opportunities for some to make huge amounts of money .
(src)="18"> But regulators were unable to keep up with the innovations , which ended up generating risks that affected the entire economy .
(trg)="8"> 这恰恰符合2008年危机爆发之前的情况 。 新技术支持的金融工具为某些人赚取巨额利润创造了机遇 。 但监管机构却无法跟上创新的步伐 ， 并最终酿成了影响整体经济的风险 。
(src)="19"> This points to a fundamental difference between global crises of the twenty-first century and , say , the Great Depression in the 1930s or , indeed , any past stock-market crashes .
(src)="20"> Because of the financial sector s growth ’ , more actors benefit from under-regulation and weak governance in the short term , making today ’ s crises more difficult to prevent .
(trg)="9"> 这体现出21世纪的全球危机与20世纪30年代大萧条或过去任何一次股市崩盘之间的根本区别 。 金融行业持续增长导致更多参与主体从短期监管不足和治理薄弱中获益 ， 从而使人们更加难以预防现在的危机 。
(src)="21"> Complicating matters further , the systems affected by today ’ s crises extend well beyond any one regulatory body s jurisdiction ’ .
(src)="22"> That makes crises far unrulier , and their consequences – including their long-term influence on societies and politics – more difficult to predict .
(trg)="10"> 令问题更加复杂的是 ， 受当前危机影响的系统远远超过任何一个监管机构的监管范围 。 这导致危机变得更加凶险 ， 并导致人们更加难以对危机所产生后果 — — 包括社会和政治领域的长期后果 — — 进行预判 。
(src)="23"> The next crises – made more likely by rising nationalism and a growing disregard for science and fact-based policymaking – may be financial , but they could also implicate realms as varied as migration , trade , cyberspace , pollution , and climate change .
(src)="24"> In all of these areas , national and international governance institutions are weak or incomplete , and there are few independent actors , such as watchdog groups , demanding transparency and accountability .
(trg)="11"> 下一次危机 — — 因为民族主义情绪抬头和人们越来越无视基于科学和事实的决策而变得可能性愈来愈大 — — 可能涉及金融 ， 但也可能涉及移民 、 贸易 、 网络空间 、 污染和气候变化等诸多领域 。 在上述所有领域 ， 国内和国际治理机构都力量薄弱或覆盖不完善 ， 而且严重缺乏要求透明度和问责制的监督组织等独立行动主体 。
(src)="25"> This makes it harder not only to prevent crises – not least because it creates opportunities for actors to game the system and shirk responsibility – but also to respond to them .
(src)="26"> The 2008 crisis cast a harsh spotlight on just how bad we are at responding quickly to disasters , especially those fueled by fragmented governance .
(trg)="12"> 这不仅加大了预防危机的难度 — — 尤其因为它为参与者提供了钻空子和逃避责任的机会 — — 还使得人们越来越难以采取措施来应对危机 。 2008年危机暴露出我们在面对灾难时的快速反应有多么薄弱 ， 尤其当造成灾难的主要原因是分散治理 。
(src)="27"> To be sure , as the Hertie School s 2018 Governance Report ’ shows , there have been some improvements in preparing for and managing crises .
(src)="28"> But we must become more alert to how developments in a wide range of fields – from finance to digital technologies and climate change – can elude the governance capacities of national and international institutions .
(trg)="13"> 可以肯定 ， 就像2018年赫蒂学院治理报告所表明的那样 ， 人类在准备应对和管理危机方面取得了一定的进展 。 但我们必须警惕更广泛领域的发展 — — 从金融到数字技术再到气候变化 — — 是以何种方式来规避国内和国际机构的治理监管 。 我们应当在上述所有领域进行危机情景预演并制定危机爆发之际的紧急计划 ， 同时采取包括管理债务水平等更强有力的措施来降低风险 ， 今天发达经济体的债务水平均远高于2008年危机爆发之前 。
(src)="30"> Moreover , we should ensure that we provide international institutions with the needed resources and responsibilities .
(src)="31"> And by punishing those who exacerbate risks for the sake of their own interests , we would strengthen the legitimacy of global governance and the institutions that are meant to conduct it .
(trg)="14"> 此外 ， 我们应当确保赋予国际机构必要的监管责任和资源 。 通过对那些因为自身利益而加剧风险的人进行惩戒 ， 我们可以强化全球治理及其责任落实机构的合法地位 。
(src)="32"> As it stands , inadequate cross-border coordination and enforcement of international agreements is a major impediment to crisis prevention and management .
(src)="33"> Yet , far from addressing this weakness , the world is reviving an outdated model of national sovereignty that makes crises of various kinds more likely .
(trg)="15"> 目前 ， 跨境协调和国际协定落实不充分是危机预防和管理的主要障碍 。 但世界各国正在重新兴起过时的国家主权模式不但没有解决这个问题 ， 而且增大了各种危机的爆发风险 。 除非我们尽快改变方向 ， 否则2118年的世界将有足够的理由来鄙视我们 。

# en/2008-financial-crisis-lessons-by-j--bradford-delong-2015-01.xml.gz
# zh/2008-financial-crisis-lessons-by-j--bradford-delong-2015-01.xml.gz

(src)="1"> What Failed in 2008 ?
(trg)="1"> 2008年败在何处 ？
(src)="3"> You actually have to implement the solution – and be willing to change course if it turns out that you did not know quite as much as you thought .
(src)="4"> That is the message of two recent books that , together , tell you everything you need to know about the 2008 financial crisis : what caused it , what can be done to prevent it from recurring , and why those things have yet to be done .
(trg)="2"> 伯克利 — 要解决问题 ， 光知道做什么是不够的 。 你实际上必须实施解决办法 — — 并且在事实证明你知道的并不如你认为的那样多时 ， 你得愿意改变办法 。 这就是两本新书一起告诉你的信息 。 这两本新书讲述了你需要知道的关于2008年金融危机的一切 ： 什么引起了金融危机 ， 可以做什么防止它再次发生 ， 以及为何这些事情还没有人去做 。
(src)="5"> The first book is The Shifts and the Shocks , by the conservative British journalist Martin Wolf , who begins by cataloguing the major shifts that set the stage for the economic disaster that continues to shape the world today .
(src)="6"> His starting point is the huge rise in wealth among the world s richest 0.1 % ’ and 0.01 % and the consequent pressure for people , governments , and companies to take on increasingly unsustainable levels of debt .
(trg)="3"> 第一本书是 《 变化和冲击 》 （ The Shifts and the Shocks ） ， 作者是保守派英国记者马丁 · 沃尔夫 （ Martin Wolf ） 。 在书的开头 ， 他对酝酿了至今仍在影响世界的这场经济灾难的重要变化做了归纳编目 。 首先 ， 他指出世界最富有的0.1 % 和0.01 % 人群财富剧增 ， 这给人民 、 政府和公司造成了日益不可持续的高负债的压力 。
(src)="7"> Meanwhile , policymakers were lulled into complacency by the widespread acceptance of economic theories such as the efficient-market hypothesis “ , ” which assumes that investors act rationally and use all available information when making their decisions .
(src)="8"> As a result , markets were deregulated , making it easier to trade assets that were perceived to be safe , but were in fact not .
(trg)="4"> 与此同时 ， 决策者因为 “ 有效市场假说 ” 等经济理论的广泛接受而志得意满 ， 有效市场假说认为投资者的行为是理性的 ， 在作出决策时会利用一切可获得的信心 。 结果 ， 市场监管被放松 ， 交易被认为安全但实际并不安全的资产变得更加容易 。 结果 ， 系统性风险悄然酝酿 ， 并且超过了央行官员最大胆的想象 。
(src)="12"> They set inflation targets at around 2 % – leaving little room for maneuver when the water got choppy .
(src)="13"> And , most audaciously of all , the European Union introduced the euro as a common currency .
(trg)="5"> 未受检验并且最终错误的假设形成了一个只能用狂妄自大形容的决策环境 。 官员低估了尾部风险 。 它们将通胀目标设定在2 % 左右 — — 这意味着当波涛汹涌时他们根本没有多少施展空间 。 此外 ， 最大胆的动作要数欧盟引入欧元作为共同货币 。
(src)="14"> Indeed , wrongheaded policymaking continued long after the crisis began .
(src)="15"> Politicians responded to worsening economic conditions by hewing as closely as possible to failed prescriptions , making sure to do no more than absolutely necessary to address the biggest economic disaster since the Great Depression .
(trg)="6"> 事实上 ， 方向错误的决策在危机开始后仍然能维持了很长时间 。 政客对恶化的经济条件的反应是坚定实施错误的药方 ， 对于这场大萧条以来最严重的经济灾难 ， 他们除了绝对需要做的事情意外什么都不做 。
(src)="17"> In the short term , he suggests that countries with reserve currencies spend more ( especially to finance public-sector investments ) and issue more debt .
(src)="18"> Their central banks , he argues , should raise inflation targets to 3 % or even 4 % per year .
(trg)="7"> 沃尔夫给抵御这场危机开出的药方简单 、 明智并且无懈可击 。 在短期 ， 他建议拥有储备货币的国家增加支出 （ 特别是公共部门投资融资 ） 、 发行更多债务 。 他指出 ， 这些国家的央行应该将通胀目标提高到每年3 % 甚至4 % 。
(src)="19"> Over the medium term , according to Wolf , countries need to put in place regulatory measures that lower debt levels and discourage overleveraging .
(src)="20"> The eurozone , too , must resolve its internal contradictions , either by disbanding or by introducing “ a minimum set of institutions and policies ” that allow the monetary union to function properly .
(trg)="8"> 在中期 ， 沃尔夫认为各国需要实施监管措施降低债务水平 、 阻止过度举债 。 欧元区也必须解决其内部矛盾 ， 要么通过解散欧元区实现 ， 要么通过引入能令货币联盟正常运行的 “ 最小限度的机构和政策组合 ” 实现 。 沃尔夫的长期解决方案包括遏制不平等 、 “ 更加全球化的监管 ” 、 更大程度的 “ 个体国家自己决定反应方式的自由 ” 以及更少受到自由市场思想束缚的经济分析 。 一开始正是自由市场思想让我们陷入了危机 。
(src)="22"> And yet , as recommendable as Wolf s proposals ’ may be , little has been done to implement them .
(src)="23"> The reasons why are found in the second book : Hall of Mirrors , by & # 160 ; my friend , teacher , and patron , Barry Eichengreen .
(trg)="9"> 但是 ， 尽管沃尔夫的方案值得推荐 ， 但几乎没有任何实施 。 原因可以从第二本书中找到 ： 由我的朋友 、 老师和 “ 老板 ” 巴里 · 艾肯格林 （ Barry Eichengreen ） 所著的 《 镜厅 》 （ Hall of Mirrors ） 。
(src)="24"> Eichengreen traces our tepid response to the crisis to the triumph of monetarist economists , the disciples of Milton Friedman , over their Keynesian and Minskyite peers – at least when it comes to interpretations of the causes and consequences of the Great Depression .
(src)="25"> When the 2008 financial crisis erupted , policymakers tried to apply Friedman s ’ proposed solutions to the Great Depression .
(trg)="10"> 艾肯格林认为 ， 我们对这场危机反应不温不火 ， 原因要追溯到作为弗里德曼 （ MiltonFriedman ） 门徒的 � � � 币经济学家对凯恩斯主义和明斯基 （ MInskyite ） 主义同行的胜利 — — 至少在解释大萧条的原因和后果方面是如此 。 2008年金融危机爆发时 ， 决策者试图使用弗里德曼提出的大萧条方案 。 不幸的是 ， 事实证明这是错的 ， 直言不讳地说 ， 货币主义者对大萧条的解释在众多方面都是错误的 ， 并且非常不完整 。
(src)="28"> The result is today ’ s stagnant economy , marked by anemic growth that threatens to become the new normal .
(src)="29"> The United States and Europe are on track to have thrown away 10 % of their potential wealth , while the failure to strengthen financial-sector regulation has left the world economy exposed to the risk of another major crisis .
(trg)="11"> 由此产生的政策足以阻止2008年后的衰退演变为完全的萧条 ； 但这一局部成功的代价也是巨大的 ， 它让政客宣布危机已经被克服 ， 应该采取紧缩并专注于结构改革 。 结果就是现在的经济停滞 ， 其特征是增长无力并且随时可能成为新常态 。 美国和欧洲损失了10 % 的潜在财富 ， 而没有强化金融部门监管让世界经济随时可能迎来新一场大危机 。
(src)="30"> Wolf and Eichengreen would agree that the main shortcomings that led to the 2008 financial crisis – and that continue to underpin our inadequate response to it – are intellectual .
(src)="31"> Indeed , the only true lesson of the crisis so far seems to be that its lessons will never truly be learned .
(trg)="12"> 沃尔夫和艾肯格林会认为 ， 导致2008年金融危机的主要缺陷 — — 以及继续破坏我们对危机的不充分反应的主要缺陷 — — 是知识缺陷 。 事实上 ， 到目前为止 ， 危机的唯一真正教训是它的教训从未被真正汲取 。

# en/2011--my-space-odyssey.xml.gz
# zh/2011--my-space-odyssey.xml.gz

# en/2015-ttip-conclusion-critical-by-carl-bildt-and-javier-solana-2015-01.xml.gz
# zh/2015-ttip-conclusion-critical-by-carl-bildt-and-javier-solana-2015-01.xml.gz

(src)="1"> A Comeback Strategy for Europe
(trg)="1"> 欧洲的重振战略
(src)="2"> STOCKHOLM / MADRID When – Pope Francis addressed the European Parliament last November , he compared the European Union to a grandmother pleasant – and rich with experience , but lacking the vitality and energy of the past .
(src)="3"> It is high time , Francis argued , that EU leaders shed their dozy image , recognize the strategic challenges that Europe faces , and forge a clear policy for tackling them .
(trg)="2"> 斯托克霍姆 / 马德里 — 去年11月 ， 教皇方济各在其欧洲议会演讲中将欧盟比作祖母 — — 和蔼而富于经验 ， 但已不再有过去的活力和能量 。 方济各说 ， 现在是一个关键时刻 ， 欧盟领导人必须摆脱懈怠形象 ， 承认欧洲所面临的战略挑战 ， 并构建应对挑战的明确政策 。
(src)="5"> But , despite its seeming lassitude , Europe retains significant strengths .
(src)="6"> It is a hub of high-level thought and innovation ; it is home to some of the world s most competitive regions and industries ’ ; and , perhaps most impressive , it has built a community and market encompassing a half-billion people .
(trg)="3"> 诚然 ， 教皇的描述在某些角度讲非常准确 。 但是 ， 尽管欧洲看起来疲态尽露 ， 但仍拥有巨大优势 。 欧洲是高水平思想和创新的枢纽 ； 是世界最有竞争力地区和产业的所在地 ； 最重要的是 ， 它还构建了一个由五亿人组成的社会和市场 。
(src)="8"> The Trans-Pacific Partnership – by which the United States and 11 other countries would create a mega-regional free-trade zone – would most likely accelerate this shift ( all the more so if China eventually joins ) .
(src)="9"> Though the TPP faces no shortage of hurdles to clear before an agreement is finalized , its potential to augment Asia s economic power ’ cannot be underestimated .
(trg)="4"> 但世界正在变化 ： 亚太地区正在日益影响全球经济和其他发展趋势 。 跨太平洋合作伙伴关系 （ Trans-Pacific Partnership ， TPP ， 由美国和其他11国建立的巨型地区自由贸易区 ） 很有可能加速这一变革 （ 如果中国最终也能加入就更加如此了 ） 。 尽管TPP距离最终完成协议还有很多障碍需要跨越 ， 但其扩大亚洲经济实力的潜力绝不容 � � � 觑 。
(src)="10"> Europe must work to secure its position in the new world order beginning – by enhancing its own trade and investment ties with the US .
(src)="11"> The problem is that , as the TPP negotiations progress , talks on the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ( TTIP ) have become so deeply mired in domestic controversies that the entire project may well be scuttled .
(trg)="5"> 欧洲必须致力于确保其在新世界秩序中的地位 — — 首先要强化其自身与美国的贸易和投资联系 。 在TPP谈判不断推进的同时 ， 欧盟-美国跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系 （ Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ， TTIP ） 谈判却深陷国内矛盾的掣肘 ， 整个工程都有可能夭折 。
(src)="12"> Business leaders on both sides of the Atlantic are convinced that a successful TTIP agreement would bring substantial economic benefits – a perception that many studies reinforce .
(src)="13"> Yet trivial issues – for example , the use of chlorinated chicken and settlements of investor disputes – continue to dominate the debate .
(trg)="6"> 大西洋两岸的商业领袖相信 ， 成功的TTIP协议将带来巨大的经济收益 — — 许多研究都强化了这一感觉 。 但一些微妙的问题 — — 比如 “ 氯化鸡 ” （ 欧洲怀疑美国鸡肉进入市场前都用氯消毒 ） 和投资者纠纷和解等问题 — — 仍主导着争论 。
(src)="14"> The TTIP s goal ’ is to unleash the power of the transatlantic economy , which remains by far the world s largest and wealthiest market ’ , accounting for three-quarters of global financial activity and more than half of world trade .
(src)="15"> ( If the TTIP was opened to other economies – such as Turkey , Mexico , and Canada – the benefits would be even greater . )
(trg)="7"> TTIP的目标是释放跨大西洋经济的力量 — — 目前大西洋两岸仍是世界最大最富有的市场 ， 占全球金融活动的四分之三和世界贸易量的一大半 。 （ 如果TTIP向其他经济体开放 — — 比如土耳其 、 墨西哥和加拿大 — — 则收益还将更大 。 ）
(src)="16"> Even more compelling than the benefits of achieving an agreement , though , are the potentially catastrophic consequences of failure .
(src)="17"> For starters , a breakdown of TTIP talks would give considerable ammunition to those in the United Kingdom who advocate withdrawal from the EU ; conversely , if the TTIP were implemented , the UK would be unwise – and thus unlikely – to leave .
(trg)="8"> 但是 ， 比达成协议的好处更加让人感到必须成功的是谈判失败可能带来的灾难性结果 。 首先 ， TTIP谈判的破裂将极大地加强英国鼓吹离开欧盟阵营的力量 ； 反之 ， 如果TTIP获得实施 ， 英国离开欧盟将是不明智之举 ， 因此也不会发生 。
(src)="18"> Moreover , the perception that the EU s internal squabbles ’ had led it to squander a strategic opportunity would probably drive the US to accelerate its disengagement from the continent .
(src)="19"> And Russian President Vladimir Putin would invariably regard the EU s failure ’ as a major opportunity to exert more influence over parts of Europe .
(trg)="9"> 此外 ， 欧洲的内讧导致其白白浪费了一个战略机会 ， 这一感觉可能促使美国加速远离欧洲 。 而俄罗斯总统普京也必然会将欧洲的失败视为影响欧洲更多地区的良机 。
(src)="20"> All of this contributes to a starkly fundamental strategic risk : If the TTIP stalls or collapses , while the TPP moves forward and succeeds , the global balance will tip strongly in Asia ’ s favor – and Europe will have few options , if any , for regaining its economic and geopolitical influence .
(trg)="10"> 所有这些凸显出一个根本新战略风险 ： 如果TTIP无法取得进展或失败 ， 而TPP取得进展并成功 ， 则全球平衡将朝着极有利于亚洲的方向发展 — — 欧洲极有可能无法重振其经济和地缘政治影响力 。
(src)="21"> When the TTIP was first proposed , Europe seemed to recognize its value .
(src)="22"> Indeed , it was the EU that pushed the US , which initially doubted Europe s commitment ’ , to launch the negotiation process in June 2013 .
(trg)="11"> TTIP首次提出时 ， 欧洲似乎能够认识到其价值 。 事实上 ， 是欧洲推动一开始对欧洲的承诺有所怀疑的美国在2013年6月启动了谈判程序 。
(src)="23"> The ambition was to complete the negotiations on “ one tank of gas . ”
(src)="24"> No one wanted to endure protracted talks – or the associated political pain .
(trg)="12"> 当时人们雄心万丈 ， 意图 “ 一鼓作气 ” 完成谈判 。 没人想让谈判长久拖延 — — 或忍受因此带来的政治痛苦 。
(src)="25"> But EU leaders essentially abandoned the project , seemingly confirming American fears .
(src)="26"> Trade negotiators struggled to make headway , while anti-globalization groups seized control of the public discourse , presenting the TTIP as a threat to everything from Europe ’ s democracy to its health .
(trg)="13"> 但欧盟领导人在事实上抛弃了这一工程 ， 而这也印证了美国的担心 。 贸易谈判在挣扎中前行 ， 而反全球化组织掌握了公共观点的控制权 ， 将TTIP描述为对一切事物的威胁 — — 从欧洲的民主到欧洲的健康莫不如此 。
(src)="27"> This is dangerously inaccurate talk , and EU leaders must prevent it from gaining any more traction by making the strategic case for the agreement .
(src)="28"> And they must revive their commitment to conclude the talks successfully in 2015 .
(trg)="14"> 这是非常危险的错误言论 ， 欧盟领导人必须拿出推进TTIP的战略性理由 ， 从而阻止这一言论获得更大的市场 。 他们还必须重振2015年成功完成谈判的承诺 。
(src)="30"> But establishing a trade agreement , especially one that entails so many regulatory issues , is always difficult , as it must account for the complexity and changeability of modern economies .
(src)="31"> The fact is that the challenges inherent in completing the TTIP are no more intractable than those that EU leaders have faced in the last few years of crisis .
(trg)="15"> 这并不是说解决TTIP谈判中仍然存在的问题轻而易举 。 但签订贸易协议 ， 特别是包含如此多监管问题的贸易协议 ， 永远不是件容易事 ， 因为它必须考虑到现代经济的复杂性和易变性 。 事实上 ， 完成TTIP所包含的挑战并不比欧盟领导人在过去几年的危机中所遇到的挑战更棘手 。
(src)="32"> When the TTIP negotiations resume next month , EU leaders must push for genuine progress , with the goal of completing a deal by the end of the year .
(src)="33"> The good news is that the recent midterm elections in the US might have improved their chances .
(trg)="16"> TTIP谈判将在下个月重启 ， 届时欧盟领导人必须推动真正的进展 ， 并以在年底完成协议为目标 。 好消息是最近的美国中期选举有可能增加他们成功的机会 。 现在 ， 美国总统奥巴马可能将从国会获得所谓的快速谈判授权 。 果真如此的话 ， 美国国会将对谈成的协议予以批准或否决 ， 而不能束之高阁 。
(src)="36"> The US presidential election season is starting , and other issues in the new year could easily take over the EU agenda .
(src)="37"> That is why Europe ’ s leaders have no time to waste .
(trg)="17"> 美国总统竞选季即将来开帷幕 ， 在新的一年里 ， 其他问题可能轻而易举地取代欧盟日程 。 正因如此 ， 欧洲领导人已无时间可以浪费 。 他们必须抓住经济机会 — — 并避免战略灾难 。

# en/2016-end-of-an-epoch-by-javier-solana-2016-12.xml.gz
# zh/2016-end-of-an-epoch-by-javier-solana-2016-12.xml.gz

(src)="1"> The Year That Ended an Epoch ?
(trg)="1"> 标志着时代终结的一年 ？
(src)="2"> MADRID – As 2016 comes to an end , the outlook for 2017 is shrouded in uncertainty .
(src)="3"> Tensions in the Middle East are rising , and populist movements have appeared in Europe and the United States .
(trg)="2"> 马德里 — — 随着2016年的结束 ， 2017年的前景被不确定性所笼罩 。 中东紧张局势正在加剧 ， 欧洲和美国出现了民粹主义运动 。
(src)="4"> In the Middle East , the tragic conflict in Syria continues , despite several fruitless attempts at rapprochement , which were marred by the fundamental disagreement about Syrian President Bashar al-Assad s future role ’ in any peace process or political transition .
(src)="5"> Meanwhile , over the past week , Syrian government troops , backed by Russia and Iran , have retaken almost all of Aleppo – once Syria s largest city ’ , now utterly devastated by the war .
(trg)="3"> 因为对叙利亚总统巴沙尔 · 阿萨德未来在和平进程或政治过渡中所起的作用存在根本性的分歧 ， 在几次修复关系的努力无果而终后 ， 中东的叙利亚悲剧性冲突仍将继续下去 。 此外 ， 过去一周 ， 叙利亚政府军在俄罗斯和伊朗的支持下 ， 已经夺回了几乎整个阿勒颇 — — 阿勒颇曾是叙利亚最大的城市 ， 现在已经彻底毁灭在战火之中 。
(src)="6"> The world s priority ’ for the coming year must be to achieve peace in Syria , which will require close regional and international cooperation .
(src)="7"> On December 27 , Iran , Russia , and Turkey will hold a tripartite meeting in Moscow to discuss a political solution for the Syria conflict .
(trg)="4"> 世界各国来年的首要任务必须是通过密切的地区和国际合作来实现叙利亚和平 。 12月27日 ， 伊朗 、 俄罗斯和土耳其将在莫斯科举行三方会议 ， 探讨政治解决叙利亚冲突 。 如果那次会议真的召开 ， 也有可能笼罩在俄罗斯驻土耳其大使被杀的阴影当中 。 最出人意料的是居然是俄 、 伊 、 土三方 ， 而非美国和欧盟 ， 参与谈判这样的协定 。
(src)="10"> One positive development this year came in March , when the EU and Turkey signed an agreement to address the refugee crisis .
(src)="11"> Turkey has now taken in some three million Syrian refugees since the beginning of the conflict .
(trg)="5"> 今年的积极进展出现在3月份 ， 当时欧盟和土耳其就解决难民危机的协议达成 。 从这次冲突开始到现在 ， 土耳其已经接收了约300万叙利亚难民 。 尽管欧盟土耳其关系现在并不在历史高点 ， 但双方必须在2017年继续对话 ， 尤其因为双方拥有基于经济相互依存 、 难民危机及反恐集体斗争等诸多共同利益 。
(src)="16"> This will not be easy , and EU negotiators have already set a timeline of only 18 months .
(src)="17"> While much remains uncertain , what is clear is that if the UK wants to retain access to the European single market , it will have to accept the EU ’ s four freedoms , including the free movement of workers .
(trg)="6"> 此外 ， 英国退欧谈判将影响明年的欧洲政治 。 英国或将于3月启动 《 里斯本条约 》 第五十条 ， 从而触发退出欧盟的正式程序 。 难点在于就确保未来欧盟-英国关系健康发展达成一致 。 做到这一点绝非易事 。 欧盟谈判人员已经制订了仅有18个月的时间表 。 虽然不确定因素仍然很多 ， 但有一点十分明确 ， 即如果英国想要保留单一市场准入权 ， 就必须接受包括劳动力自由流动在内的欧盟四项自由政策 。
(src)="18"> In 2017 , several European countries will hold general elections , and there is a risk that isolationist , anti-European populist movements will make a strong showing .
(src)="19"> For the EU to lose a country as militarily and economically important as the UK is bad enough ; but to lose a founding EU member state , such as France , would be tragic .
(trg)="7"> 有几个欧洲国家将在2017年举行大选 ， 孤立主义者 、 反欧洲民粹运动或将在此期间表现强势 。 对欧盟而言 ， 失去像英国这样在军事和经济上都很重要的国家无疑是一种打击 ； 但失去法国这样的创始成员国或将酿成悲剧性的后果 。
(src)="21"> But this will not lessen the challenge for EU governments in the year ahead .
(src)="22"> They must unite societies divided by powerful global forces , such as globalization and rapid technological innovation .
(trg)="8"> 幸运的是 ， 许多欧洲人对欧盟的看法事实上在英国退欧公投后有改善的迹象 。 但这并不意味着欧盟政府在今后一年所面临的挑战减轻 。 他们必须重新团结被全球化和快速技术创新等强劲全球势力切割得四分五裂的社会 。
(src)="23"> The Brexit referendum , followed by Donald Trump ’ s victory in the US presidential election , signaled the rise of populism in the West .
(src)="24"> But now that Trump is filling his cabinet with oligarchs and former military men , we have reason to doubt that he will keep his promise to govern without the Washington establishment “ . ”
(trg)="9"> 英国退欧公投 、 而后是唐纳德 · 特朗普在美国总统大选中的获胜标志着西方民粹主义势力抬头 。 但现在 ， 特朗普正在征召寡头和前军人进入其内阁 ， 我们有理由质疑他是否会履行自己摆脱华盛顿 “ 建制派 ” 进行治理的承诺 。
(src)="25"> Trump ’ s incoming administration is full of unknowns , but there can be no doubt that his rejection of multilateral institutions will endanger international efforts to cooperate on solutions to the world s biggest problems ’ .
(src)="26"> This holds peril for US-EU relations .
(trg)="10"> 特朗普即将执政的新内阁充满了未知数 ， 但毫无疑问他对多边机构的抗拒会危及合作解决全球最严重问题的工作 。 这必将对美国-欧盟关系构成威胁 。 过去几年 ， 巴黎气候协议及伊朗核协议曾为这个远离多边主义的世界带来一线曙光 。 而在未来几年 ， 这样的曙光会变得越来越稀有 。